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Abstract: In light of the Arab Spring, media professionals and academics have expanded 
the scope of their focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Yet, 
relatively little attention has been paid to two powerful forces that could significantly 
affect its economic and political landscape: power sector reform and renewable energy 
development initiatives. This paper attempts to outline the history and future of these 
initiatives in the region by focusing on three MENA region countries, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), with a focus on Abu Dhabi, along with Egypt, and Morocco. 
Furthermore, this paper analyzes how these two initiatives are affecting one another in 
the context of the domestic political landscape and economy. The results of this analysis 
point to three key aspects of power sector reform initiatives affecting domestic renewable 
energy development: the level of governmental financial supervision, electricity 
subsidies, and the terms of engagement between the state-run single buyer utility and 
independent power producers (IPPs).    
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Introduction: Linking Renewable Energy and Power Sector Reform in 
the MENA Region 
Introduction 
MENA region countries have pursued a wide array of power sector reforms and 
renewable energy development initiatives over the past two decades. This chapter 
provides an overview of these initiatives and the motives behind them in the entire 
Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, as well as a breakdown of common power 
sector reform models and strategies.  
 
Overview of Renewable Energy Initiatives in the MENA Region  
Although the MENA region has become inextricably linked to fossil fuels, the past 
decade has witnessed a noticeable effort by both oil-producing and non-oil producing 
countries to develop local renewable energy resources. Indeed, the majority of MENA 
governments now have dedicated agencies or state-run companies mandated both to 
promote renewable energy development in-country and to direct the construction and 
operation of actual projects. Some of these government initiatives, such as the UAE’s 
Masdar Initiative, have received considerable publicity in major press outlets, while 
others, like Egypt’s New and Renewable Energy Authority, remain unknown outside of 
the energy world.  
 In terms of realized renewable energy production, the Middle East region alone 
produced 46,578 Gwh of energy from renewable sources in 2009, with roughly 86% 
coming from biomass and hydroelectric facilities.1 Meanwhile, North Africa, Egypt and 
                                                
1International Energy Agency. "Renewables and Waste in Egypt in 2009." International Energy Agency. 
2012. http://www.iea.org/stats/renewdata.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=EG (accessed February 10, 2012)., 
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Morocco produced 1524 Gwh of energy from wind sources alone in the same year.2 
Since 2009, several large-scale wind and solar projects have come online, which will add 
considerably to this figure.  
 The size and scope of planned renewable energy projects in the region has also 
been increasing. In Morocco, the Ouarzazate Concentrated Solar Power Project, 
scheduled to be commissioned in 2015, is to have a production capacity of 500 MW – 
this is approaching the average production capacity of a U.S. coal plant (667 MW).34 
Meanwhile, Lebanon, a country that relies heavily on energy imports, hopes to more than 
double domestic renewable energy generation capacity between 2011 and 2014, from 10 
MW to 25 MW.5 
 Saudi Arabia, the largest single fossil fuel producer in the world, has engaged the 
renewable energy market through a different avenue. The Kingdom is working with 
Germany's Centrotherm Photovoltaics, the world’s second largest manufacturer of solar 
equipment, to construct a $1.1 billion polysilicon manufacturing plant. Saudi Arabia has 
also begun planning for the construction of the King Abdullah City for Atomic and 
Renewable Energy, which aims to act as a regional research and development center. It is 
                                                
2 2009 IEA Renewables Statistics Egypt and Morocco. 
3 African Development Bank Group Project Team. "Environmental and Social Impact Assessment." 
African Development Bank Group. 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Environmental-and-Social-
Assessments/Ouerzazate%20ESIA%20ex%20sum%20version%20ENG%20Oct%202011%20%282%29.p
df (accessed February 10, 2012)., p.2 
4 Energy Information Administration. "Form EIA-860 Database, Annual Electric Generator Report." 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html. 2005. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html (accessed February 10, 2012). 
5 Hayek, Kamal. "Distributed Renewable Energy Generation in Lebanon and the Net-­‐Metering 
Opportunity." Beirut Energy Forum. September 29, 2011. 
http://www.beirutenergyforum.com/presentations%202011/Presentation%20Mr.%20K.%20Hayek-
%20BEF%202011.pdf (accessed February 10, 2012). 
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estimated that the Saudi government has pledged $100 billion for the City’s construction, 
to begin in 2013.6  
 
Drivers of Renewable Energy Initiatives  
The reasons behind the region’s dramatic upswing in renewable energy initiatives vary 
somewhat from country to country; however, when rationalizing their decision to pursue 
renewable energy, MENA political and business leaders tend to rely on the same 
arguments. Regardless of their respective energy balances, they all point to the finite and 
environmentally costly nature of fossil fuels. Saudi Shura Council member, Osama Al 
Kurdi, has highlighted the Kingdom’s excessive electricity and fossil fuel consumption 
on Saudi national television, openly warning of the dangers of basing the national 
economy so heavily on the production of a single resource, oil.7 
 The move by MENA politicians towards renewable energy is driven by long-term 
baseline economics. Oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia are seeking to capitalize on 
rising petroleum prices by directing a greater share of their oil towards international 
markets, where it will fetch a price many times higher than in the Kingdom; the Saudi 
government thus hopes to develop renewable sources to compensate for these increased 
exports on the domestic front. There is also discussion of exporting renewable energy, 
which could fetch a high price from environment-oriented European governments, as 
well as provide further compensation under international carbon trading schemes.8 
                                                
6 Wam. "Mideast injects Dh661bn in energy projects." Emirates 24/7. February 3, 2012. 
http://www.emirates247.com/business/energy/mideast-injects-dh661bn-in-energy-projects-2012-02-03-
1.441032 (accessed February 10, 2012). 
 
7 SaudiEconomyGateway. "Al Taqa Al Bedeela wa Al Mutajidida." YouTube. September 21, 2011. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jD7kNhhON6I (accessed February 10, 2012). 
8 Ibid. 
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 Renewable energy projects are still recognized by the public as frontier 
technologies, whose successful employment signals a level of social advancement, and 
thus national pride. MENA politicians are fully aware of this and in many cases are 
heavily publicizing government-directed renewable energy initiatives domestically in 
order to cast themselves as champions of modernization and progressivism. The UAE 
leadership in particular has taken care to orchestrate an expansive public relations 
campaign promoting its renewable energy initiatives. Their greatest public relations 
success so far came in 2009, when Abu Dhabi beat out Bonn, Germany to become the 
site of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), despite the country’s 
abysmal environmental record.  
 The state-run media agencies of other governments, such as Algeria, Morocco, 
and Egypt have also been careful to leak news of proposed projects to global media 
outlets. The Algeria Presse Service recently announced $60 billion dollars in renewable 
energy investment by 2030, which was subsequently reported in Bloomberg.9 More 
recently, Moroccan Minister of Energy, Mines, Water, and Environment, Amina 
Benkhadra, interviewed with Macropolis.net to layout and rationalize Morocco’s 
substantial wind and solar energy initiatives.10  
  
Overview of Power Sector Reform in MENA Region 
The rise in renewable energy initiatives in the MENA region has occurred during a period 
of significant power sector reform. Since 1990, each of the three countries to be 
                                                
9 Razzouk, Nayla. "Algeria Plans $60 Billion in Renewable Energy Investment by 2030, APS Says." 
Bloomberg. February 9, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-09/algeria-said-to-plan-60-
billion-in-renewable-energy-investment-by-2030.html (accessed February 14, 2012). 
10 Macropolis.net. "Morocco Renewable Energy Megaprojects - Marcopolis.net Interview with H.E. Amina 
Benkhadra." Macropolis.net. July 29, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHZswlWeJY0 (accessed 
February 14, 2012). 
 5 
examined in this case study – the UAE, Morocco, and Egypt – have taken steps to loosen 
the state’s hold over the power sector. In each case, they have sought to unbundle 
vertically and horizontally-integrated monopolies in order to allow private companies 
access to local electricity markets, either as producers or distributors.  
 The UAE initiated the competitive restructuring of its power sector in 1996, with 
the establishment of the Privatisation Committee for the Water and Electricity Sector. 
The Committee was exploratory in nature, charged with assessing the options of the 
UAE’s most powerful emirate, Abu Dhabi, for permitting private developers to play a 
role in stabilizing the country’s electricity supply, improving the efficiency of the sector, 
and creating employment opportunities.11 The Committee’s findings led to the breakup of 
the monolithic Water and Electricity Department into multiple generation and distribution 
companies, and a single national grid company. Private producers have since been 
allowed to participate on the generation side of the electricity supply chain; however, 
their ownership stakes are limited by federal authorities.12  
 Egypt also began reforming its power sector in the mid-1990s, following much 
the same strategy of separating a state-run conglomerate into legally distinct entities.13 
Again, the state has retained control of the great majority of generation and distribution 
activities, while allowing a small number of private developers to build, own, and operate 
what are essentially pilot power generation projects. Egypt’s reform strategy diverges 
from Abu Dhabi in that it plans allow Egyptian electricity consumers to conclude direct 
                                                
11 Abu Dhabi Regulation and Supervision Bureau. "Annual Report 1999." Abdu Dhabi Regualtion and 
Supervision Bureau Web site. 1999. http://www.rsb.gov.ae/PDFs/pub9.pdf (accessed November 13, 2011).  
12 ADRSB Web site. Water and Electricity Sector Overview 2008/2009. 
13 Rasazi, Hussein, Vincent Castel, and Emmanuel Nzabanita. "The Arab Republic of Egypt: Power Sector 




bilateral contracts for the purchase of electricity with present and future generation 
companies.14 
 Morocco’s l’Office National de l’Electricité (ONE) began issuing requests for 
proposal for private generation companies in 1994.15 However, unlike the UAE and 
Egypt, Morocco has allowed private developers on both the generation and distribution 
side to flourish. Indeed, private producers are now responsible for the majority, 68%, of 
electricity generation in Morocco, and private distribution companies play a significant 
role in providing electricity to many of the country’s urban centers.16  
 
The Drivers of Power Sector Reform 
In each case, power sector reform has been driven to some extent by a variety of 
challenges and opportunities. These range from expanding grid access and bringing 
electricity to rural communities, lowering production costs, improving efficiency and 
stability of supply, and perhaps most importantly, attracting the necessary capital to 
improve power sector infrastructure and boost generation to meet surging demand. This 
follows the conventional economic logic that private producers will be able to operate 
more efficiently than their public sector counterparts. 
 Yet the real force behind privatization-oriented power sector reform in developing 
countries has been multilateral financial institutions, upon which many developing 
country governments have relied for decades to finance their electricity sectors. The 
World Bank in particular, which remains a major power project financier in developing 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 Energy Sector Management Assistance Program. "Impact of the Credit Crisis on Investments in the 
Power Sector: the Case of Morocco." Energy Sector Management Assistance Program. January 20, 2011. 
http://www.esmap.org/esmap/sites/esmap.org/files/Esmap%20Vulnerability%20Morocco%2001%2012.pdf 
(accessed January 16, 2012). 
16 Ibid.  
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countries, has stipulated competitive restructuring as a necessary condition for receiving 
loans from the organization.17  
Initially, Bank Operational Manual Statement 3.72, which was published in 1978, 
guided the Bank’s lending practices and financial assistance programs for public 
utilities.18 Statement 3.72 laid out several policy goals that served as guidelines for sector 
reform, including “provide power service on the basis of least-cost development 
programs, (b) strengthen the sector's institutions and improve their efficiency, (c) increase 
local resource mobilization and catalyze cofinancing [sic], and (d) improve access to 
electricity by disadvantaged groups.”19 
 Roughly a decade later, the Bank found that progress on Bank-financed 
electrification projects was insufficient. Based on these findings, it adjusted its power 
sector funding paradigm in order to greater emphasize the necessity of privatization and 
free markets. Specifically, the five guiding principles to which requesting governments 
must adhere now include: “transparent regulation, commercialization and corporatization, 
imports of services, a commitment to reform, and greater private investment.”20 Other 
multilateral financing institutions have followed suit, namely the International Monetary 
Fund and several regional development banks such as those serving Asia and Africa.21  
                                                
17 Wamukonya, Njeri. "Power sector reform in developing countries: mismatched agendas." Energy Policy, 
2003: 1273-1289., p. 1275 
18 The World Bank Group. "Lending for Electric Power in Sub-Saharan Africa." World Bank. 2011. 
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/58D5511F6E77E24985256
81800610D04 (accessed February 16, 2012). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Njeri., p. 1275; African Development Bank Group. "Nigeria Economic and Power Sector Reform 
Program." African Development Bank. 2009. 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Nigeria%20-
%20The%20Economic%20and%20Power%20Sector%20Reform%20Program%20(EPSERP).pdf 
(accessed February 16, 2012). 
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United Nations Environment Programme expert, Njeri Wamukonya, interestingly 
points out that the level of commercialization to which developing countries must aspire 
in order to qualify for multilateral financial assistance has risen along with the demand 
for electricity. This has been construed by some analysts as a ploy to allow multinational 
companies – headquartered in countries providing the World Bank with the majority of 
its capital – access to the developing world’s vast commercially untapped electricity 
markets.22 The power of multilateral financing institutions derives from the fact that it is 
exceedingly difficult for many public utilities, starved of cash by the national 
government, to operate effectively without external assistance.23 
Finally, there is the issue technology transfers. Proponents of reform argue that 
deregulation is necessary to allow new technologically distinct entrants access to the 
electricity market.24 If the power sector is structured in such a way as to ensure state 
dominance through contractual arrangements with third parties that limit ownership and 
profits, private companies will be reluctant to operate in the electricity market. This could 
be especially disadvantageous for rural communities, which stand to benefit from 
technological advances in distributed generation.   
 
A Breakdown of Common Power Sector Models and Reform Strategies 
As previously stated, power sector reform is almost always liberalizing. Differences 
between reform models and strategies normally lie in the extent of liberalization, which 
in turn depends on the power sector’s current level of commercialization, as well as 
prevailing domestic political and economic realities.  Broadly, there are four types of 
                                                
22 Njeri., p. 1275 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. 
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power sector models: vertically-integrated monopolies, single buyer, wholesale 
competition, and retail competition.25  
 Vertically-integrated monopolies are characterized by a single legal entity 
providing all power-related services – generation, transmission, and distribution – within 
a defined territory. Monopolies of this sort are self-regulated. Determining the real price 
of electricity is difficult in this type of environment. Prices paid to generators and for 
transmission are considered internal transactions and can thus be priced in such a way so 
as to beautify the utilities financial statements, rather than reflect actual costs.  
 Per the single buyer model, which prevails in each of the three countries 
examined in this case study, a single entity – either a vertically integrated unit or a 
transmission company attached to a larger umbrella organization – enters into power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) with privately owned and operated independent power 
producers (IPPs). In most cases, the single buyer offers the IPP a fixed price for the 
electricity it produces over a 20-25 year period, long enough for the IPP to recover its 
costs and realize a profit. Prices are transparent to the extent that they are reflected in the 
PPA. 
 In wholesale competition scenarios distributors have access to multiple suppliers 
while the grid functions as the marketplace. Generators and distributors operate as 
unbundled legally separate entities, are usually privately-owned and operated, and are 
allowed to contract with one other freely, operating under the auspices of an independent 
regulator. The actual functioning of a wholesale competition electricity network is 
extremely complex, relying on nodal pricing, yet subject to a host of other factors not to 
                                                
25 Deloitte Touche Tomatsu Emerging Markets, Ltd. "Sustainable Power Sector Reform in Emerging 
Markets - Financial Issues and Options." USAID. June 18, 2004. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADB308.pdf (accessed February 17, 2012)., p. 4-6 
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be discussed here. This model exists in several developing and middle-income countries, 
including Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and the Philippines.26 
 At the far end of the spectrum is the retail competition model, which, unlike the 
wholesale market model, allows for competition between any unit in the electricity 
supply chain and any other unit. In this scenario, end-users are not forced to contract with 
a specific distributor, but can choose from multiple distributors or even contract directly 
with producers. This model has only recently been deployed in industrialized countries, 
including parts of the U.S., and only in limited form in a few developing countries.  
 Most reform strategies involve moving gradually from a more state-controlled 
power sector to a more liberalized one. In most cases, an exploratory committee of 
experts will study the current power sector landscape before making recommendations to 
legislatures who then enshrine those recommendations in law. New institutions are 
erected and tasked with fulfilling their new legal mandates.  
 
Theorizing on the Effects of Each Model on Renewable Energy Development 
The ultimate question this paper seeks to answer is: what is the effect of operating under 
a specific model or moving from one model to another as these models exist in the 
MENA region? To answer this question, the political economies, power sector structures, 
and renewable energy efforts in three countries – the UAE (with a focus on Abu Dhabi), 
Egypt, and Morocco will be analyzed over the course of the next three chapters. 
Following this analysis, this paper will attempt to identify common themes regarding the 
interaction between renewable energy and the power sector – including features of this 
                                                
26 Ibid., p.10 
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interaction specific to the MENA region – before closing with a discussion of the key 























Chapter 1:  Abu Dhabi and the Masdar Initiative 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine renewable energy development and power sector 
reform efforts in Abu Dhabi, with an eye towards analyzing the interaction between two. 
Both renewable energy and power sector initiatives are described in the context of the 
emirate’s political, economic, and energy landscapes. What follows is a brief overview of 
UAE political and economic history and a description of Abu Dhabi’s existing power 
sector structures followed by an outline of the emirate’s current renewable energy 
initiatives and an assessment of the extent to which existing and future power sector 
reform efforts could positively or negatively impact the prospect for renewables in the 
country.  
 
UAE Political and Economic History 
Political History 
Although Arab tribes, both nomadic and sedentary have coexisted in the southeastern 
gulf for millennia, the federation known as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) came about 
only in 1971, after the British negotiated an end to a two centuries old protectorate 
agreement it had enforced in the region.27 The idea of a unifying tribal federation was 
itself the brainchild of a British political resident. 28 Having dealt with the seven tribal 
fiefdoms known as the Trucial States for roughly a century, the British political resident 
                                                
27 The Official Portal of the United Arab Emirates. History of the Country and Establishment of the Union. 
December 1, 2011. http://www.government.ae/web/guest/uae-history (accessed December 1, 2011).    
28Davidson, Christopher M. The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival. Boulder: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 2005., p. 42. 
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of the Persian Gulf setup the Trucial Council in the mid-1950s, with the aim of improving 
regional security. The Council provided a forum for Sheikhs to discuss and decide upon 
regional issues, as opposed to acting independently. As the British protectorate over the 
Trucial States came to an end, the political resident became progressively more insistent 
on the role the council was to play in regional governance, stepping aside as the 
Council’s chair in 1965, so that the Council may select a chair from among member 
sheikhs.29  
Resistance to federalism remained upon official termination of the UAE’s status 
as a British protectorate.30 The rulers of the seven different Emirates, especially the 
smaller ones, each sought somewhat successfully to maintain a degree of cultural and 
political autonomy.  Aside from foreign policy, defense, and the management of 
communication networks, each emirate is free to legislate and enforce within its borders 
as it pleases. 
At the federal level, the Supreme Council functions as the highest legislative and 
executive authority. In the mold of the original Trucial States Council, the Supreme 
Council counts as its members the leading sheiks of the most dominant tribe of each 
emirate.31 Ostensibly, each sheikh is given equal say as a member of the council. In 
practice, however, Abu Dhabi and Dubai dominate federal level politics, with the 
President coming from Abu Dhabi and the Prime Minister from Dubai. The President is 
by far the most powerful political actor in the UAE, followed by the Prime Minister.  
                                                
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid., p. 47 
31 UAE Cabinet. The Supreme Council. 2011. 
http://www.uaecabinet.ae/English/UAEGovernment/Pages/TheSupremeCouncil.aspx (accessed December 
1, 2011). 
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Democratic participation in the UAE is extremely limited; as of 2006, half of the 
members of the Federal National Council, a politically weak legislative advisory group, 
are electable, the other half are appointed by the individual rulers of each emirate.32 There 
are licensing and financing rules regarding the establishment of most types of 
organizations; however, most civil society actors regulate themselves in accordance with 
the Emirati political climate. This self-regulation stems from what political scientists cite 
as the “ruling bargain” between the political class and ordinary citizens.33 The average 
citizen chooses to refrain from political activism, so long as the state continues to provide 
a substantial welfare cushion, in the form of subsidized goods, marriage funds, and other 
economic benefits.   
Internationally, the UAE has worked to maintain strong relationships with the 
West, especially the U.S. and the U.K., while still championing Arab causes, particularly 
Palestinian statehood. This seemingly contradictory stance extends to the country’s social 
policy as well, where there has been an attempt to promote the UAE as a beacon of 
innovation and progressivism, while reinforcing traditional Islamic mores. This is clearly 
an attempt by UAE rulers to maintain the support of both progressive and conservative 
elements within society, essentially an extension of the ruling bargain.  
 
Economic History 
For most of their history, the tribal fiefdoms that today constitute the UAE relied on pearl 
production, agriculture, fishing, and herding as their primary means of wealth 
                                                
32 Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs. December 1, 2011. 
http://www.mfnca.ae/?lang=en&m=options&act=index&page=FNC%20Elections&category=34 (accessed 
December 1, 2011). 
33 Davidson., p. 103 
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generation.34 It was not until 1962 that the region began exporting oil and not until the 
1970s that these exports would rise to become the country’s primary source of national 
income.35 The great majority of these revenues accrued to Abu Dhabi, which produces 
roughly 90% of the oil in the UAE.36 The UAE’s founding President Sheikh Zayed Al 
Nahyan downplayed Abu Dhabi’s incentive to hoard its wealth, sharing revenues with 
other emirate with an eye towards even development and social integration across the 
seven emirates. 
A major step in this direction came in 1974 when the UAE Council of Ministers 
published a set of countrywide development goals. At the heart of these goals and the 
impetus behind their promulgation has been the development of the country’s human 
capital, specifically the skills and education of the Emirati citizen. This focus on human 
development remains an important fixture of the political discourse in the country.  
Overall, the UAE economy has grown in dramatic spurts followed by less 
dramatic recession periods. Periods of rise and fall have been largely linked to oil prices 
whose changes create economic ripple effects. The Ministry of Planning makes budgetary 
and economic decisions based on historical oil revenue estimates and when these 
revenues fail to materialize a variety of planned projects and social services face cuts.37  
The tremendous reliance on a non-citizen workforce can also be seen as cause for 
economic instability concerns. While the proliferation of free-trade zones within the 
country has attracted a variety of multinational companies, few employ Emirati citizens. 
They rely instead on highly educated western professionals and uneducated south Asian 
                                                
34 Al Sadik, Ali Tawfik. "Evolution and Performance of the UAE Economy (1972-1998)." In The United 
Arab Emirates: a new perspective, by Ibrahim Al Abed and Peter Hellyer, 202-230. London: Trident Press, 
2001 
35 Ibid., p. 208 
36 Ibid., p. 203 
37 Ibid., p. 209-219 
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laborers. The government has taken steps to grow the productive capacity of its citizenry 
in recent years by incentivizing education and the hiring of Emiratis, but employment 
numbers still skew largely in favor of expatriates.  
 
Political Motives Behind Renewable Energy Development 
Abu Dhabi’s renewable energy efforts may be seen as a precautionary step towards 
ensuring the long-term viability of the current political system.38 The development of new 
energy sources before the old ones run out will ensure that the government maintains the 
necessary wealth to provide its citizens with enough of a welfare cushion that they quietly 
accept the political status quo.  
Foreign policy considerations have also figured into Abu Dhabi’s renewables 
push. Abu Dhabi’s leaders hope that by transforming the emirate into a renewable energy 
leader, they will gain international prestige and increase their prospects for developing 
advantageous bilateral political and economic relationships. The clearest example of this 
is Abu Dhabi’s successful campaign to host the U.N. agency, IRENA. The UAE beat out 
Germany, despite its poor environmental record, thanks to promises of substantial 
financial support, in the neighborhood of $135million, for the agency.39 The prestige 
associated with the hosting of the UN agency plays well with domestic audiences who 
will be less likely to agitate for reforms if they believe their government adept at handling 
foreign affairs.  
                                                
38 Davidson., p. 104 
39 Krane, Jim. "The Basis of Abu Dhabi’s Quest for Renewable Energy and Policies Required to Meet its 
Goals ." Dubai School of Government Web site. September 2010. 
http://www.dsg.ae/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Ln9a0YI9K2g= (accessed November 6, 2011). 
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In order to appease the domestic polity, the Abu Dhabi government has chosen to 
ground its newfound commitment to renewable energy in the UAE’s Bedouin culture and 
in the vision of the country’s founder, former President Zayed Bin Al Nahyan. The web 
site of the country’s main renewable energy initiative, Masdar, attributes dynamic moves 
by Abu Dhabi’s leaders towards renewable energy and environmentalism to their 
Bedouin roots, which have instilled in them the importance of sustainability and resource 
conservation, both key to survival in the desert.40 Masdar’s Chairman, Ahmed Ali Al 
Sayegh, cites Masdar’s renewable energy initiatives as an extension of UAE founder and 
President Shiekh Zayed Bin Al Nahyan’s pioneering environmental efforts in the Gulf 
region.41 Yet, the idea of Abu Dhabi’s leaders having a historically ingrained sense of 
environmentalism is ironic given that they preside over and enable the world’s tenth 
highest rate of per capita electricity consumption, much higher if South Asian laborers 
are factored out.42  
   
Economic Motives 
In light of its domestic energy shortages and extremely reliance on single individual 
sources for domestic consumption (natural gas) and export (oil) the UAE’s move toward 
renewable energy can be seen as making long-term economic sense. More interestingly, 
however, is Abu Dhabi’s use of renewable energy as a means to develop its human 
                                                
40 Masdar. About Us: Masdar. October 25, 2011. 
http://www.masdar.ae/en/Menu/index.aspx?MenuID=42&CatID=12&mnu=Cat (accessed November 6, 
2011). 
41 Masdar. A Message from the Chairman: Masdar. 2011. 
http://www.masdar.ae/en/Menu/index.aspx?MenuID=42&CatID=20&mnu=Cat (accessed November 27, 
2011). 
42 World Bank. Data: Electric power consumption (kWh per capita) . 2011. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC?order=wbapi_data_value_2008+wbapi_data_va
lue+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc (accessed November 28, 2011). 
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capital. The emirate hopes to create an indigenous base of expertise in what is still a 
frontier technology field.  
If the UAE is successful in its attempt to develop renewable research and 
development capabilities, it could transform itself into a hub for design and possibly 
manufacturing - given the glut of cheap South Asian labor - of renewable energy 
technologies. Success, particular on the design side of renewable technologies, could 
provide huge social and economic windfalls to the UAE. Finally, increasing the UAE’s 
reliance on renewable energy would allow it to redirect its oil and gas away from 
domestic consumption and towards more profitable activities, such as aluminum 
production, exporting, and petrochemical manufacturing. 43 
 
Abu Dhabi’s Power Sector Structure and Reform Efforts 
Power Sector Structure 
The power sector in Abu Dhabi currently follows a single buyer model. The single buyer, 
the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company (ADWEC), purchases electricity from 
generation companies, transmits it over the national grid, and sells it to distribution 
companies, which then deliver directly to customers. The ADWEC enters into long-term 
power purchase agreements with generation companies, 95% of which are roughly 40% 
privately-owned and entirely privately operated. The ADWEC also pays generation 
company fuel costs.  
An independent regulator, the Abu Dhabi Regulation and Supervision Bureau 
(ADRSB), regulates pricing and pricing methods throughout the electricity provision 
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supply chain, including power purchase agreements (PPAs), which is the price charged to 
the ADWEC by generation companies, and Bulk Supply Tariffs (BST) – the price paid to 
the ADWEC by distribution companies.44 The ADRSB also issues licenses, required by 
all IPPs, and aims to enforce a variety of safety and performance standards on all 
electricity sector entities.  
 
Power Sector Reform Efforts 
Efforts at power sector reform and the transition from a single vertically-integrated and 
entirely state-owned entity providing all power related services to the single buyer model 
which prevails today began in 1996, with the establishment of the Privatisation 
Committee for the Water and Electricity Sector. The committee was tasked with looking 
at options for the restructuring and privatization of the sector, with the stated aims of 
securing supply, improving economic efficiency and quality of service, promoting private 
investment, creating employment opportunities for UAE nationals, and maximizing 
revenue from any asset sell-offs.45  
The Committee’s findings led to the passage of Law No (2) Concerning the 
Regulation of the Water and Electricity Sector, which came into force in 1999.46 Law No 
(2) provided for the reorganization of the power sector’s singular management entity, the 
Water and Electricity Department (WED), into separate generation, transmission, and 
distribution companies, and the introduction of private funds into the sector.4748 An 
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umbrella organization, the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority (ADWEA), was 
created to house the ADWEC, the transmission company, and the various distribution 
companies. The WED’s assets, liabilities, and employees have since been transferred to 
one of the new public companies.  
The actual introduction of private capital and the divestiture of state assets has 
only occurred on the generation side. The government has allowed two or more joint 
venture partners to own up to 40% of a single generation company; however, no single 
joint venture may on its own possess more than 25% of the emirate’s total generation 
capacity.49 The Abu Dhabi government maintains its domination over the ostensibly 
private power generation industry through the ADWEC, which acts as the majority 
shareholder in all independent power producers (IPPs) with an ownership stake of 60% or 
greater.50 
In 1997 the Privatisation Committee issued the first request for proposal (RfP) for 
private power generation in the country’s history; this RfP was for the construction and 
operation of a combined-cycle natural gas, power and water generation plant situated on 
Abu Dhabi’s coastline called Taweelah A2.51 CMS Generation, a US power company, 
won the bid and the administration of the contract was transferred to the ADWEC. A new 
holding company Emirates CMS was created to own and manage the new plant, with 
ADWEC maintaining a 60% ownership stake and CMS retaining the other 40%.52 
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Responsibility for planning and contracting for new production has since been transferred 
to the ADWEC.53  
 
UAE Energy Economy 
In terms of production, the UAE relies exclusively on two sources: crude oil and natural 
gas. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) energy balance statistics for the UAE put 
crude oil production at 127,883 thousand tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) and natural gas 
production at 40,917 ktoe.54 The UAE exports roughly 80% of its crude oil, but is a net 
importer of natural gas. The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) is the UAE’s 
domestic oil and gas supplier, while gas imports come from Qatar’s offshore North 
Field.55  
The great majority of the UAE’s electricity production facilities are combined 
cycle natural gas plants situated on the Abu Dhabi coast. The energy from these plants is 
used not only to generate end-consumer electricity, but also to power water desalination 
facilities – a major source of potable water for the country. 56 The ADWEC estimates that 
3-3.5% of energy produced in the UAE goes toward desalination.57 
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Subsidies and Consumption Patterns 
As of the 2010, energy subsidies in the UAE hovered around $18 billion, or 6% of 
GDP.58 The Abu Dhabi government in particular heavily subsidizes electricity, 
dramatically so for UAE nationals. UAE nationals living in remote areas pay 3fil/kwh for 
electricity, while those living in cities pay 5fil/kwh.59 The system marginal price for 
electricity (i.e. the average price paid by the ADWEC to generators) hovers around 
3.23fils/kwh in January and 4.71fils/kwh in August.60 Subsidies are such that the Abu 
Dhabi government is passing none of the operational and maintenance costs associated 
with either transmission or distribution along to UAE consumers in remote areas, and just 
a fraction of that cost to UAE residents living in urban areas. Such exorbitant subsidy 
levels have translated into extremely high per capita electricity consumption, 17,296 kwh 
per capita in 2009.61 Indeed despite having the world’s seventh largest natural gas 
reserves, the UAE had been experiencing rolling blackouts due to gas shortages prior to 
the construction of the Dolphin Pipeline.62 
 
Political and Economic Motives behind Power Sector Reform 
The UAE is a wealthy country and a net donor of foreign assistance by a large margin. 
There is no evidence that its utility was suffering from the usual set of symptoms 
common to public utilities in developing countries such as capital scarcity and massive 
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debt. As such, reform efforts have been spurred by the desire for increased economic 
efficiency, not external pressures from foreign financiers.  
 
Current Efforts at Developing Renewables 
All of Abu Dhabi’s renewable energy efforts are being executed through the Abu Dhabi 
Future Energy Company (ADFEC) a.k.a. Masdar. Masdar is a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of the Mubadala Development Company – Abu Dhabi’s primary investment vehicle for 
socially responsible economic diversification – and figures into Abu Dhabi’s broader 
economic development strategy as outlined in The Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030.63 
Unlike the renewable energy development efforts in other MENA countries, Abu 
Dhabi’s highly publicized Masdar Initiative is a multi-faceted effort aimed at 
transforming the Emirate into a global hub for renewable energy technologies. The 
emirate is not merely soliciting investment and operational expertise; rather, it is seeking 
to develop such expertise domestically. Ultimately, the government aims to transform 
Abu Dhabi into a research and development center for renewables, resulting in 
knowledge transfers to UAE nationals. 
 
A Renewable Energy Hub for Knowledge Transfers 
Two of the Masdar Initatives five “units” or programs are aimed directly at facilitating 
knowledge transfers: Masdar City and the Masdar Institute. Masdar City, to be situated 
17km form downtown Abu Dhabi, seeks to attract the R&D headquarters of the world’s 
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renewable energy technology companies.64 To this end, Abu Dhabi authorities have 
declared Masdar City a “special economic zone,” along the lines of neighboring Dubai. 
These special zoning provisions will provide companies with streamlined services for 
registering businesses, government relations services, and visa processing, as well as 
100% foreign ownership, zero taxes on companies and individuals, zero import tariffs, 
and unrestricted capital and profit movements.65 Extending these privileges to renewable 
energy businesses can also be seen as part of broader power sector reform efforts.  
As of 2010, Masdar’s stated goal was to attract 1500 companies to operate and 
invest in Masdar City.66 This will be difficult as there is little regional demand for 
renewable technology, with the UAE and other Gulf countries presently relying 
comfortably on oil and gas to meet their energy demands and offering little in the way of 
renewable energy promotion strategies and regulatory frameworks.67 Thus far, 
companies’ interest in Masdar City, which has been lauded by Masdar officials, is 
grounded primarily in their desire to win contracts to build the city itself. 
Masdar City will also house a graduate-level university, the Masdar Institute, 
whose academic programs center on clean and renewable energy technologies. The 
Institute was established in cooperation with MIT. According to former MIT Chancellor 
Phillip Clay, MIT will be working with the Masdar Institute “to develop collaborative 
research and create indigenous academic programs, to create a strategy for 
                                                
64 Masdar. Masdar City. 2011. http://masdar.ae/en/Menu/index.aspx?MenuID=48&CatID=27&mnu=Cat 
(accessed December 1, 2011). 
65Masdar City. Special Economic Zone. 2011. http://www.masdarcity.ae/en/38/special-economic-zone/ 
(accessed December 1, 2011). 
66 Reiche, Danyel. "Renewable Energy Policies in the Gulf countries: A case study of the carbon-neutral 
‘‘Masdar City’’ in Abu Dhabi." Energy Policy, 2010: 378–382. 
67 Ibid. 
 25 
commercializing Masdar Institute's research results and to build the institute's 
organizational and administrative capabilities.”68  
The first class of students began coursework in September 2009. As of October 
2010, UAE nationals made up 43% of the Institute’s student body. The Institute aims to 
increase that percentage by creating a pre-Masters program for UAE nationals, which 
acts as a prep school for the Institute, providing them with a guided academic year, 
during which they may strengthen their academic credentials.69 
Masdar Captial, a renewable energy investment portfolio consisting of the Masdar 
Clean Technology Fund (MCTF) and the DB Masdar Clean Tech Fund (DBMCTF), can 
also be seen as an attempt to acquire renewable energy expertise. Both funds are 
managed in conjunction with partner groups.70 The MTCF is a $250 million fund 
managed in conjunction with Consensus Business Group, Credit Suisse and Siemens AG, 
while DBMTCF is a $265 million fund managed jointly with Deutche Bank.71 Large 
stakes in renewable technology companies, especially controlling stakes, will help Abu 
Dhabi acquire proprietary renewable technology and expertise it can use to develop local 
industries.  
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Completed and Planned Renewable Energy Projects 
Masdar Power is the unit directly responsible for the development and operation of 
renewable energy projects. At present, a 10MW photovoltaic (PV) solar plant in Masdar 
City and 2MW of rooftop solar generation from panels on 11 Abu Dhabi government 
buildings are the only active renewable energy generation projects in the emirate.7273 
Another solar planted called Shams 1, billed as the largest concentrated solar power 
(CSP) plant in the world, is currently under construction; its capacity is expected to be 
around 100MW.74 In order to encourage investment in Shams 1 and promote the use of 
solar energy as an electricity source, the Abu Dhabi Ministry of Finance will subsidize 
the expected high cost of Shams 1 electricity through a “green payment” to ADWEC.75 
The Shams 1 plant is to follow the same ownership structure as Abu Dhabi’s other 
independent water and power producers, with Masdar controlling 60% of the plant and 
Total S.A. and Abengoa Solar each controlling 20% respectively.76  
Abu Dhabi also hopes to enter the carbon emissions reduction market. Its vehicle 
for doing so, Masdar Carbon, hopes to create value by providing carbon emissions 
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reduction restructuring for carbon emitting companies who will then be reimbursed under 
the United Nations Clean Development Mechanism program.77 The company claims to be 
working on a massive carbon capture and storage project that will capture carbon emitted 
by Emirati heavy industry and subsequently inject it into Abu Dhabi’s oil and gas fields 
for enhanced recovery.  
 
Relative Financial Commitments to Renewable Energy 
In terms of financial commitments, Masdar’s budget had been set at $22 billion, but has 
since been decreased to $18.7 billion in the wake of an expected decrease in demand for 
property in Masdar City.78 This is roughly 0.8% of the UAE’s GDP. The majority of 
these funds will be going toward the construction of Masdar City; however a portion has 
already been allocated to Shams 1. Financing for Shams 1, which is coming from 10 
major financial institutions including BNP Paribas, the National Bank of Abu Dhabi, 
Société Générale and the Bank of Tokyo, has closed at $600 million.79  
 
The Interaction between Power Sector Reform and Renewable Energy 
The Advantages of Reform and the Current Model 
Abu Dhabi’s single buyer model enables renewable energy development in several ways. 
Abu Dhabi’s current power sector policies offer a stable, relatively low-risk environment 
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for the attraction of renewable energy investment funds and the development of 
renewable sources. The government’s extreme economic power and authoritarian 
political system enables it to easily direct economic resources towards socially beneficial 
projects. The 60:40 ownership ratio offered by the ADWEC effectively acts as a loan 
guarantee; ADWEC, whose capital resources being tied to the Abu Dhabi treasury are 
virtually unlimited, will no doubt be willing to shoulder would-be visceral financial 
threats to renewables projects. Furthermore, the strength of Abu Dhabi’s credit rating – 
AA – makes whatever financial guarantees it offers all the more valuable.  
The ADWEC’s use of long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs), which offer 
generation companies full-cost recovery pricing for 20 year periods, exemplifies the 
emirate’s willingness to shoulder risk. These PPAs provide renewable energy developers 
with an economic foundation. Solar and wind construction and operation outfits with 
PPAs in hand are more able to secure financing from private investors; they signal to 
investors that the government is willing to bare the potential economic costs associated 
with the project.  
The 60:40 model, combined with ADWEC’s ownership of Abu Dhabi 
Transmission and Despatch Company (TRANSCO), ensures would be renewable 
developers access to the national grid upon completion of their projects. The same cannot 
be said for renewable developers in unregulated markets, such as Texas where Wind 
Farms constructed in the West are having difficulty reaching their customer base in the 
east due to lack of grid access and political opposition to the building of necessary 
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transmission lines.80 The government has also shown a great deal of flexibility regarding 
the operating procedures of private partners, allowing them to subcontract as necessary.81  
Finally, there is no mention of a sunset clause regarding the contractual 
relationship between the ADWEC and IPPs. In many cases, IPPs fear sunset clauses. 
Power projects often require large upfront costs and take many years to become 
profitable. This economic reality has driven populist moves to nationalize private power 
companies in many developed and developing countries over the past century. Under 
Abu Dhabi’s system, IPPs need not fear future expropriations at the height of their 
profitability. For renewables, this could help drive costly technological upgrades that 
whose costs would only be recovered in the longer term.  
 
Disadvantages  
On the other hand, a single buyer model and limited ownership mean there is little 
opportunity for firms to maximize profits through competitive business practices in the 
same way that they could in Texas, where there exists the possibility for complete private 
ownership and direct contracting with end-users.82 Firms’ profit-maximizing and 
efficiency calculations within the context of the Abu Dhabi power sector are likely to be 
vastly different than those same calculations in the context of a truly competitive market. 
For example, regardless of whether or not firms invest sizable amounts of capital in a 
plant, the obstacle to full ownership and profit-maximization on capital investments 
remains. Just as the absence of a sunset clause could help drive capital investment 
                                                
80 State Energy Conservation Office. "Wind Energy Transmission." State Energy Conservation Office Web 
site. www.seco.cpa.state.tx.us/re_wind-transmission.htm (accessed December 1, 2011). 
 
82 Texas Electric Choice. Electricity Basics. 2011. 
http://www.powertochoose.org/_content/_about/electricity_basics.asp (accessed December 2, 2011). 
 30 
upgrades in renewable energy projects, obstacles to full-ownership could detract from 
them.  
Continuing with this logic, allowing firms the right to own new plants, renewable 
or otherwise, would necessitate a variety of other structural reforms that would greatly 
diminish the Abu Dhabi government’s level of control over the power sector, and in turn 
diminish its ability to dispense key gifts to its citizens in the form of free water and 
extremely cheap electricity. If firms were given full ownership, then they would surely 
demand fair access to consumers; however, it would be difficult for the Abu Dhabi 
government to convince them that fair access was being provided, so as long as some 
generation companies, along with transmission and distribution networks, are owned by 
the same umbrella organization. ADWEC could easily cross-subsidize generation at some 
of its plants by offering those plants cheaper access to the grid.  
Were the Abu Dhabi government to retain its vertically-integrated monopoly, it 
would have to be upfront with companies regarding the accounting practices of each 
ADWEA subsidiary. Currently, ADWEC publishes the bulk supply tariff, which is the 
price of electricity sold to distribution companies.83 Yet, the price of electricity detailed in 
ADWEC’s purchase power agreements with IPPs remains unpublished.  
 
Conclusion 
Abu Dhabi’s approach to renewable energy is unique among MENA region countries as 
are the drivers behind its efforts at power sector reform. The primary reason for this 
relates to the emirate’s economic position as a wealthy country with a highly developed 
                                                
83 Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company. "Bulk Supply Tariff 2010." Abu Dhabi Water and 
Electricity Company. 2010. http://www.adwec.ae/documents/bst%202010%20leaflet%20to%20discos.pdf 
(accessed November 25, 2011). 
 31 
power sector infrastructure and near complete territorial electrification. The country’s 
high level of development and traditional authoritarian political structures have created a 
unique set of incentives, challenges and opportunities for Abu Dhabi’s leaders.  
While other MENA countries see both renewable energy and power sector reform 
as a means to achieve more acceptable living standards, the view in Abu Dhabi seems be 
more focused on using renewable energy as a means to promote its international standing 
and influence. Indeed, the majority of government funds dedicated to renewable energy 
are being spent either on the construction of Masdar City or on investments in research 
centers and companies developing projects in other parts of the world. In a sense, Abu 
Dhabi has moved to provide renewable energy services to foreign populations before 
having developed its own internal renewable energy capacity. Yet, while seemingly 
ironic, this strategy fits with the country’s plan to develop renewable technology 
expertise. 
 The country’s power sector reform efforts and present structure may offer just the 
right kind of environment to allow renewable energy companies an opportunity to carve 
out a small, but growing market niche in the country. Full privatization of the sector 
would surely undermine the development of renewables, regardless of whether or not 
feed-in tariffs were offered. The government is able to mitigate risks associated with 
renewable energy projects in a myriad of ways that private sector entities never could or 
would. Perhaps as the price of oil continues to rise and domestic supplies diminish, the 
emirate will redouble its efforts to develop renewable energy capacity locally. At this 
point, the technology may be commercially viable to the extent that privatization would 
serve only to drive down prices as opposed to price out desired sources. Abu Dhabi’s 
renewable energy initiatives, though ridiculed by many critics as being more stylish than 
substantive, may actually be quite sensible. 
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Chapter 2:  Egypt, the National Renewable Energy Agency, and the 




Despite gradual steps toward engagement with IPPs, the Egyptian government has chosen 
to retain control over renewable energy projects for financial reasons. This presents both 
challenges and opportunities. Furthermore, the recent overthrow of President Mubarak 
has drastically changed the country’s political landscape and could have powerful 
implications for the future of renewable energy in the country. This chapter examines the 
implications of Egypt’s reliance on bilateral aid funneled through the National 
Renewable Energy Agency on the country’s renewable energy prospects, as well as the 
potential effects of the recent revolution. 
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Egyptian Political Economy in Brief  
Unlike the UAE, the Egyptian government’s official website does not contain a page 
summarizing the formation and development of modern Egypt. Perhaps this is because it 
would be difficult to trace the origins of the state through several millennia – as well as a 
politically eventful 20th century – in one page. Indeed, Egyptian cultural history is long 
and complex. Most studies of modern Egypt begin with the overthrow of King Farouk by 
the Free Officers Movement. Given the power concentrated in the hands of each of 
Egypt’s rulers during the post-Farouk period, along with the cults of personality each 
ruler inspired, Egypt’s republican history most readily lends itself to delineation by 
president. 
 
Gamal Abd Al Nasser 
Nasser’s policies centered on state-directed industrialization projects. The state’s 
capstone project, which would come to symbolize the resurgence and industrialization of 
Egypt, was the Aswan High Dam, now known as Aswan 1. The goal of the high dam was 
both to provide hydroelectric power and to increase the amount of arable land along the 
Nile through irrigation.84 The U.S. and the World Bank had promised to act as the 
primary financers for the High Dam’s Construction; however, in light of Nasser’s 
decision to remain neutral during the Cold War, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles abruptly and publicly pulled funding from the project. This in turn led to Nasser’s 
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decision to nationalize the Suez Canal and the accompanying political crisis. By the end 
of 1957 Nasser had nationalized all British and French assets within the country, 
including tobacco, cement, pharmaceutical, and phosphate industries.85 
 Nasser also initiated expansive land reforms. In his quest to politically and 
economically weaken Egypt’s powerful landowning class, Nasser passed Law No. 178, 
which limited individual landownership to 200 feddans or roughly 208 acres. Prior to 
Nasser’s initiative, the majority of Egypt’s land was held by an extremely small minority 
of Egyptians.86 Nasser’s attempts at creating more equitable economic circumstances for 
ordinary Egyptians cemented his popularity among the masses.   
 
Anwar Al Sadat 
Nasser’s successor, Anwar Al Sadat, who came to power in 1970, turned Egypt away 
from the Soviet Union, reengaged with the U.S. and other Western powers, and embraced 
Western capitalism through his policy of “Al Infitah” or openness. After the perceived 
Egyptian military success of the 1973 October War, Sadat felt politically empowered to 
break with Nasser’s legacy and felt that guided economic openness would bring 
prosperity to Egypt. 
Unfortunately, Sadat’s economic initiatives did little to provide ordinary 
Egyptians with the possibility of generating capital.87 Instead, government officials and 
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the politically well-connected were the major beneficiaries of massive state asset sell-offs 
that left Egyptians who relied on the services provided through those assets much worse 
off.88 Economic power remained increasingly concentrated and directed by the regime 
and its apologists. Meanwhile, the multitude of Egyptians that benefited from Nasser’s 
state welfare programs were suddenly disenfranchised. These economic moves combined 
with Sadat’s embrace of Israel and the Camp David accords roused many political foes.  
 
Hosni Mubarak 
While Sadat promulgated a policy of contained economic openness designed for the 
regime’s benefit, Mubarak executed a similar strategy in the political sphere. He relaxed 
restrictions on the press, allowed for civil society associations to flourish, and provided 
political parties other than the ruling National Democratic Party with limited avenues for 
political participation.89 In this way, Mubarak aimed to appease the dangerous political 
opponents amassed by his predecessor. Mubarak hoped to rein in Sadat’s Infitah and 
heavily subsidized state infrastructure projects. However, in the early 1990s Egypt’s 
economic fortunes took a downturn in the wake of falling oil prices and the Egyptian 
government was forced to accept conditional loans from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which prescribed deep cuts in a variety of state programs.90  
                                                
88 Ibid., p. 118-119 
89 Ibid., p. 166 
90 Ibid., p. 167 
 36 
 Internationally, Mubarak largely avoided taking a leadership role in regional 
affairs as did both Nasser and Sadat. Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Egypt has 
generally followed the lead of the Saudis on regional matters, supporting the initial 
American campaign against Saddam and championing Saudi-backed politicians in 
neighboring Lebanon.91 Mubarak, like his Saudi counterparts, has sought to carve out a 
critical role for Egypt in promoting America’s agenda in the region.  
 
Mohamed Hussein Tantawi 
At the time of writing, Tantawi had been in power for just over a year. Since his 
ascension, mass protests have continued unabated and parliamentary elections have 
occurred. The Muslim Brotherhood and the salafist party Al-Nour now control 
overwhelming majority of seats in Egypt’s legislature and have agreed to form a 
governing coalition. Meanwhile, Presidential elections are scheduled to be held by the 
end of June 2012.  
  
Political and Economic Motives for Developing Renewables 
The rationale behind renewable energy initiatives in Egypt is more straightforward than 
in Abu Dhabi. Egypt faces regular blackouts, which strike even the most upscale urban 
neighborhoods. Chronic gasoline shortages and long lines at the pump also occur on a 
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semi-frequent basis. Renewable energy is simply another supply option that can help the 
government meet surging demand and provide a host of other positive externalities.  
 Egypt’s economic position allows it to benefit significantly from development 
assistance offered by multilateral financing institutions. To date, nearly all of Egypt’s 
renewable energy projects have been spurred by both bilateral and multilateral grants and 
below market rate loans that would likely be unavailable to the government were it 
focused solely on fossil fuel resources.  
 On the political side, all that can be said at the time of writing is that Egypt’s 
political future remains so uncertain that any assessments as to how the ruling political 
class sees renewable energy are baseless. The established political order whereby a small 
cadre of ex-military members from the National Democratic Party decide upon all major 
domestic and international issues has been upended. A number of political factions are 
vying for power. The Islamists are in the lead, but it is unclear whether or not the military 
will be willing to relinquish control.  
That being said, the basic relationship between the government, its constituents, 
and its foreign partners is in flux. A whole host of factors – chiefly the political positions 
of the Egyptian economic elite – will affect the energy mix. Furthermore, Egypt’s access 
to Western aid could vary greatly depending on the stance of the new government and as 




The Power Sector in Egypt 
Structure and Governance 
In terms of governance, the Egyptian electricity sector can be separated into two parts: oil 
and gas activities, both upstream and downstream, controlled by the Ministry of 
Petroleum, and electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, controlled by the 
Ministry of Electricity and Energy (MOEE).92 The activities of the two ministries, such 
as the pricing of petroleum products and electricity, are coordinated within the Council of 
Ministers, which operates through specific ministerial committees. In 2006, the Egyptian 
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif created an overarching body, the Supreme Council for 
Energy, to oversee broad energy policy initiatives in terms of legislative and institutional 
frameworks and investment programs.93  
The MOEE owns all newly created power sector state-entities through the 
umbrella company, the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (EEHC). The EEHC in 
turn contains 16 subsidiaries including: “one hydropower…five thermal electricity 
generation companies; nine electricity distribution companies; and a transmission-and-
dispatch company.”94 The EEHC is responsible for managing the sector’s finances; 
however, there are six separate authorities, which report directly to the MOEE including: 
the Rural Electrification Authority, the Hydropower Projects Executive Authority, the 
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New and Renewable Energy Authority, Atomic Energy Authority, Nuclear Power Plants 
Authority, and Nuclear Material Authority.95 These authorities are responsible for 
research, as well as the planning and execution of area-specific projects. With the 
exception of renewable energy, completed projects are transferred to the EEHC upon 
completion. Renewable energy projects, mostly wind farms, are being retained under the 
New and Renewable Energy Authority (NREA).  
The Egyptian Electric Utility and Consumer Protection Agency (EEUCPRA) acts 
as an independent regulatory body. Established in 2002, the EEUCPRA’s current set of 
prerogatives includes licensing operating companies, presumably private ones, 
establishing performance benchmarks, and of course promoting competition.96 If the New 
Electricity Law is passed, the EEUCPRA will be empowered to set electricity tariffs.97 
Until the law is passed, the EEUCPRA is responsible to regulate only one buyer, the 
Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company (EETC) – the sole buyer of electricity in 
Egypt, which sells electricity directly to distribution companies and to large customers.  
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Power Sector Reform 
Electricity reforms in Egypt occurred within roughly the same time frame as those in Abu 
Dhabi, with the unbundling of the Egyptian Electricity Authority taking place in 2000.98 
This unbundling was done both vertically, through the separation of distribution, 
generation, and supply, and horizontally, through the creation of multiple companies 
operating within each part of the supply chain.  
Most recently, Egypt’s chief executive body, the Cabinet of Egypt, professed its 
commitment to a fully competitive power sector by endorsing the 2008 New Electricity 
Law, which was on track to be submitted to Parliament in 2011.99 The law “envisages 
divestiture of up to 49% of each [Egyptian power] company,” all of which are currently 
state-owned.100 The law will allow eligible consumers to purchase electricity directly 
from producers through bilateral contracts. There will also be a Transmission System 
Operator responsible for fulfilling bilateral contracts between consumers and producers.  
Thus far, the only means through which IPPs can operate in Egypt is through the 
BOOT (Build, Own, Operate, Transfer) program.101 The BOOT program, allows IPPs to 
build, own, and operate generation plants for a predetermined period, usually long 
enough to ensure a reasonable rate of return on capital investments, before transferring 
ownership to the EEHC. As of 2011, there are two independent power producers 
operating generation plants in Egypt: U.S.-based InterGen (a joint venture of Bechtel 
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Enterprises and Shell Generating Ltd.) and Tanjong’s Powertek.102 InterGen’s plants 
produce a total of 650MW, while Powertek’s capacity hovers around 1400MW. As of 
2011 total installed capacity is roughly 24,000MW; therefore, private companies are 
responsible for a mere 8.5% of total electricity generation in Egypt.103  
 
Energy and Electricity Subsidies 
Egypt heavily subsidizes a variety of petroleum and natural gas products, which are 
calculated by the government as the losses of the Egyptian General Petroleum 
Company.104 As per contractual agreements, the oil extraction companies are entitled to a 
share of the oil they extract. The Egyptian government then repurchases this oil and sells 
it at dramatically reduced prices to consumers; for example, liquefied petroleum gas is 
bought on average for 1858 LE per ton from partner companies and sold domestically for 
200 LE per ton.105  
Unlike Abu Dhabi, the Egyptian government does not heavily subsidize 
electricity directly. Instead, prices are kept low through natural gas subsidies, which if 
eliminated would raise electricity prices by about 10.3%.106 The level of subsidies in the 
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sector does not approach that of Abu Dhabi and the government has been on track to raise 
electricity prices by roughly 5% annually for the next several years since 2005.  
 
A Long History of Renewable Energy Development 
Egypt has a relatively long history of meeting a portion of its energy needs through 
renewable sources using modern technologies, beginning in 1960 with the construction of 
Aswan 1 Dam, followed by the completion of Aswan 2 in 1985.107 In 1986, it created a 
government agency, the NREA, dedicated to the promotion of renewable energy and the 
management of renewable energy projects.108  
 The NREA’s staff hovers around 750 and consists of many well-qualified 
renewable energy professionals including engineers, technicians, and economists, as well 
as administrative staff.109 Surprisingly, the organization receives no money through state 
appropriations, but is instead expected to generate enough revenue to survive by 
providing studies for third parties, conducting tests, issuing certificates, and performing 
other services.110 In reality, the revenue produced from these operations is consistently 
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insufficient to cover annual costs, thus the NREA survives largely through loans from the 
National Investment Bank of Egypt, which are not expected to be repaid.111  
 
A Renewable Energy Development Strategy 
The NREA’s mandate to pursue wind and solar projects figures into the Egyptian 
government’s national diversification strategy. The strategy, which was approved on 
February 2008, aims to have 20% of Egyptian electricity consumption come from 
renewable sources by 2020.112 It also specifies the percentage to come from each source; 
wind energy is to represent 12% of total generation or 7200 MW, while 8% is to come 
from hydro power and solar.  
The strategy envisions a leading role for the private sector in the development of 
Egypt’s renewable energy capacity, laying out a number of incentives meant to 
encourage private sector participation. First among these is the EETC’s soliciting of bids 
from private companies to build, own, and operate wind farms in Egypt. As an incentive, 
the EETC is offering potential renewable energy investors a long-term power purchase 
agreement of between 20 and 25 years. Electricity from wind farms and solar plants will 
be bought at above market rates and paid in foreign currency to ensure the economic 
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viability of the projects.113 Meanwhile, renewable energy equipment imports will be 
exempt from customs duties; however, in order boost Egyptian manufacturing, projects 
making use of local components will be privileged over those relying exclusively on 
foreign parts and labor.114  
The Egyptian government is also taking steps to ensure land availability for large 
scale wind farms and solar projects. On May 26, 2010, the Cabinet of Egypt approved the 
allocation of 7600 km2 of desert land for the construction of future projects.115 Project 
investors will pay for land leases with a percentage of the energy generated annually from 
their projects.  
 
R & D Initiatives 
The NREA has established facilities for research, development, and training along the 
lines of Abu Dhabi’s Masdar Institute. On the R&D side, the Center for Renewable 
Energy Research and Testing, created in collaboration with the European Union and the 
Government of Italy, is acting as an equipment and appliance testing facility within 
Egypt’s borders. Meanwhile, the NREA’s training centers provide general as well as 
technical knowledge to students in renewable energy and energy efficiency.116 However, 
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unlike Masdar, the NREA provides no detail regarding the qualifications of either 
instructors or the applicants on its website, nor does it provide any specific information 
regarding material covered in its training programs.  
Perhaps most importantly, the NREA has laid the ground work for future wind 
energy investment by preparing a comprehensive wind energy atlas for Egypt. The atlas 
was prepared between 1998 and 2005 by the NREA, the Egyptian Meteorological 
Society, and the Danish Risø National Laboratory, and offers detailed statistics regarding 
the country’s wind energy potential.117 According to the Atlas, the Gulf of Suez and Gulf 
of Aqaba regions offer the greatest potential energy output. Indeed the Gulf of Suez is 
one of the world’s most attractive locations for wind energy due to consistently high wind 
speeds, “proximity to load centers and transmission infrastructure, and availability of 
large uninhabited desert area.”118 
 
Completed and Planned Projects 
Egypt’s first non-hydropower renewable energy project was the wind farm at Ras Gharib. 
The monolithic Egyptian Electricity Authority, with assistance from USAID, completed 
the 250 kw project in 1988.119 A short while later, a second much larger wind farm was 
installed in phases from 1992 to 1996 with the help of Germany. This second farm is 
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connected to the local Hurghada city grid on the Red Sea coast and functions as Egypt’s 
research and development center for wind energy.120  
Egypt’s largest non-hydropower renewable energy production facility by far is the 
Zafarana wind farm. The wind farm is situated along the Gulf of Suez and has been under 
construction in phases since 1997. It consists of eight units, each of which has followed a 
different financing scheme and involved a different set of project developers. The eighth 
and possibly final unit has a capacity of 120MW and was completed in 2010, bringing 
total production capacity of the farm to around 545MW.121  
On the solar front, one major project, El Kuraymat, came online in July 2012, 
while another, Kom Ombo, is still several years from completion. El Kuraymat, which is 
about 100km south of Cairo combines fossil fuel and renewable energy technology in one 
facility; a 110 MW natural gas plant operates at night, while a 150 MW solar thermal 
field operates during the day. The plant was constructed by Spanish energy group 
Iberdola under contract from the NREA, which was in turn supported financially by the 
World Bank and the Japan International Cooperation Agency.122 The second solar 
project, Kom Ombo, is a 100 MW plant to be built over a five year period between 2012 
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and 2017, with financing coming from the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank, and UN’s Clean Development Mechanism.123 
 
Power Sector Reform and Renewable Energy 
A look at the financing of the Egypt’s largest non-hydropower renewable energy project, 
the Zafarana Wind Farm, offers considerable insight into the roles of the public and 
private sectors in developing Egypt’s renewable energy capacity so far. Zafarana is 
entirely state-owned, a decision that was made for economic reasons.124 Sherif 
Aboulnasr, Chairman of the Egyptian National Committee of the World Energy Council, 
points out that the incentives the Egyptian government would have had to offer 
companies to develop a project as large as Zafarana would have had to outweigh the 
costly and restrictive financing those companies would have faced from investors.  
As a developing country government agency, the NREA can borrow at below 
market rates and solicit grants and other forms of international economic assistance 
unavailable to private companies. The agency also requires a very low return on equity 
for projects under its direction, faces no debt service coverage ratio from lenders -usually 
high given perceived wind technology risks - and enjoys longer debt repayment 
periods.125 
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Full NREA ownership has also simplified the development of Zafarana on the 
domestic front. Negotiations for access rights and the building of transmission lines with 
the national grid company are streamlined and local stakeholders, such as on-site banks, 
landowners, and local suppliers of equipment and other goods, have given their consent 
that they will assist in the project’s development as needed.126  
 
A Closer Look at Zafarana 
The NREA relied entirely on a grant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark to 
finance the pilot unit of the Zafarana wind farm, Zafarana 1, while each of the subsequent 
seven units were financed through a mixture of grants, soft loans, mixed credit, and 
commercial loans. As the total project nears completion, the NREA has had to rely more 
heavily on mixed credit and commercial loans; however, the interest rates are still lower 
than those available to private developers working on similar projects.127 
 A feasibility report for the 120 MW Zafarana 3 wind farm prepared by 
independent Danish consultant Wolfgang Mostert provides a more detailed picture of the 
financial and logistical considerations involved in developing a large-scale wind project 
in Egypt. A table in the report provides a concise summary of the financing for the 
project as follows: 
 




Table 1.1: Composition of Project Finance for Zafarana 3 Wind Farm128 
Composition of Project 
Finance 
Egyptian Pounds (EGP) in % of total 
NREA equity 19,206,671 2% 
mixed credit loan 740,091,600 84% 




loan from NIB to NREA 108,837,805 12% 
 
A mixed credit loan from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) is 
the major source of funding for the project. The loan is being distributed through an on-
site private bank with the NREA covering exchange rate risk.129  
 
Conclusion 
While Egypt has moved slowly towards enhancing the private sector’s role in fossil fuel 
power generation, it has favored bilateral assistance in the form of grants and low interest 
rate loans funneled through the NREA for the development of its renewable energy 
sources. Indeed, the government’s ability to secure financing on such favorable terms 
has, in part, driven interest in renewable energy. The most recently constructed Zafarana 
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unit, Zafarana 8, was financed entirely through a mixed credit loan on which DANIDA 
has agreed to pay the interest.  
 However, the question remains: for how much longer can Egypt expect to receive 
such favorable financing terms for its renewables projects? Wolfgang Mostert, an 
independent energy economist and consultant who prepared a feasibility study for 
DANIDA regarding the construction of Zafarana 3, believes there is an implicit 
understanding between Egypt and its foreign development partners that external subsidy 
support for Egypt’s renewables sector is temporary and will be phased out as the baseline 
economics for wind farms improve. Yet, he also points out that for private developers to 










Despite an authoritative monarch, the Moroccan government has been willing to 
relinquish considerable control over traditionally state-dominated sectors, and the power 
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sector is no exception. Its geographic location presents a host of economic opportunities 
provided by Western European markets. Europe also sees Morocco as a potentially stable 
supplier for its energy needs and has been working closely with the Moroccan 
government to develop its renewable energy generation capacity. This chapter breaks 
down the various national and international frameworks guiding Morocco’s renewable 
energy policy that have evolved alongside the country’s power sector structures. 
  
Morocco Political Economic History 
Morocco sits at the northwestern edge of the African continent, straddling Spain to the 
north, its Arab neighbors to the east, and sub-Saharan Africa to the south. Globally, 
Morocco lies at roughly the halfway point between East Asia and North America. Due to 
the country’s continental centrality, it has been exposed to a wide variety of cultural, 
economic, and political influences and much of its population is multilingual.  
 France has had an outsize level of influence on current Moroccan political and 
economic structures. In the wake of independence on March 2, 1956, French colonists 
left behind a vast infrastructure of roads, railways, irrigated land, and a phosphate export 
supply chain.131 Indeed, French resident-general, Hubert Lyautey designated what was to 
be the capital, Rabat, and the economic center, Casablanca, based on his conception of 
the American cities of Washington D.C. and New York.132  
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Following independence, a power struggle among Morocco’s divided nationalist 
factions ensued. This division was exploited by the Moroccan royal establishment, which 
vied for authority with the various factions, most notably the political party Istiqlal.133 
French attempts to displace the royal family only served to bolster their nationalist 
credentials in the eyes of the masses. King Hassan successfully promulgated a 
constitution within two years of his ascension cementing his role as military chief and 
primary executive.  
 Economically, Hassan worked to develop Morocco’s capital-intensive agricultural 
sector with an eye towards external markets.134 The country soon became more 
economically integrated into the international system, but also more vulnerable to its 
boom and bust cycles. The poor, largely unable to access the wealth generated by 
Moroccan industries, relied on informal business activities, subsisting on subsidized food 
products; subsidies for basic goods and services were made possible by American 
financial aid.135 Morocco’s role as the world’s largest phosphate exporter has also helped 
it to maintain solvency.  
 During the last decade of his rule before his death in 1999, Hassan undertook 
significant political and economic reforms.136 He strengthened the parliament and human 
rights protocols, moved forward with Euro-Mediterranean economic integration projects, 
and sold off many state assets – including electricity generation sites (to be discussed in 
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much greater detail below). This was done to pave the way for his son, Mohammed VI, to 
continue on a similar path once he ascended the throne.137  
 Mohammed VI has further strengthened human rights laws and sought to 
maintain the same general economic outlook as his father – increasing Moroccan import-
export activity and remaining economically close to Western Europe and the U.S. The 
arrival of the Arab Spring in neighboring Tunisia sparked mass protests in the country 
and a new round of reforms has been initiated; however, they have been decried as 
insignificant by democratic activists as the King still controls the key levers within the 
executive branch of government.138  
 
The Power Sector in Morocco 
Structure and Governance 
Unlike Egypt and Abu Dhabi, the Moroccan government has allowed for significant 
private sector participation in the power sector. Although the primary actor remains the 
vertically-integrated, state-run l’Office National de l’Electricite (ONE), private 
companies account for roughly 68% of generation and a large portion of distribution in 
urban centers; only the national grid remains entirely in ONE’s hands.139140 All private 
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producers generating more than 50 MW must enter into contract with ONE; however, 
producers generating amounts below 50 MW are largely unregulated.141 ONE offers all 
IPPs long-term PPAs, which guarantee them grid access for anywhere between 20 and 30 
years.  
 At present, the ONE-controlled national grid receives electricity from four types 
of producers: IPPs, imports from Spanish and Algerian transnational lines, ONE-owned 
production, and auto-producers – labeled as such by ONE, auto producers are primarily 
wind energy sites generating electricity for their own operation as well as nearby 
industrial facilities and selling the excess to grid.142 In terms of supply ratios, the 
breakdown for these four sources is as follows: IPPs supplied the grid with 57% of total 
electricity transported, ONE with 29.2%, transnational connections with 15.5%, and auto-
producers with 0.4%.143 
 Within these four categories, there are several dominant forces that together offer 
a near-complete characterization of Moroccan electricity production. First, among private 
producers, Jorf Lasfar Energy Company (JLEC) stands out as supplying nearly 44% of 
national electricity demand via a 1,356 MW coal plant.144 Another quarter of electricity 
production comes from ONE’s coal fuel oil and natural gas plants. Spanish imports 
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account for 15% of total supply and the final 10% come from both public and privately 
owned renewable generation sources to be outlined more extensively later in this chapter.  
 Broad energy policies are designed within the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water 
and the Environment (MEMWE). Policies are then debated and either accepted or 
rejected by the Moroccan Parliament.145 Aside from the MEMWE, all other Moroccan 
government agencies have a renewable energy focus, these include: Centre de 
Développement des Energies Renouvelables (CDER), Centre d’Information sur l’Energie 
Durable et l’Environnement (CIEDE), L’Association Marocaine des Industries Solaires et 
Eoliennes (AMISOLE), the Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique et Technique 
(CNRST), and Unité des Technologies et Economie des Energies Renouvelables 
(TEER).146  These agencies are described in greater detail below.  
At present, there is no independent regulator overseeing activities or transactions 
within the electricity market.147 As such the electricity market for large-scale industrial 
clients is largely unregulated. The low-voltage residential market faces some regulation 
from the Directorate of Electricity and Renewable Energies (DEER).148 DEER is 
responsible for security of electricity supply as well as the promotion of demand-side 
management and energy efficiency. Unlike most bodies exercising regulatory functions, 
DEER is not involved in the tariff-setting process; tariffs are set directly by the Prime 
                                                
145 GTZ. "Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Promotion in Morocco." GTZ. 2011. 
http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/maghreb-naher-osten/marokko/26777.htm (accessed March 10, 2012). 
146 REEEP. 
147 Ibid.   
148 Ibid. 
 56 
Minister’s office.149 Both DEER and the MEMWE are allocated funds directly from the 
national budget.  
 
Financing of Power Projects 
Public Sector 
Most public sector projects are financed via bilateral donors, multilateral institutions, 
ECAs, and local banks.150 ONE is the primary recipient of financing for such projects. 
Recently, major financiers have included: the Islamic Development Bank, European 
Investment Bank, and the World Bank.151 Several large power plants, one of them a 
hydro station, as well as infrastructure improvements and expansions are being financed 
via these institutions. Local banks are also willing to assist in the financing public 
projects, which they see as a good investment.  
Private Sector 
Private sector projects rely more heavily or private international banks. In the wake of the 
recent financial crisis, many private international lenders are imposing stricter financing 
terms on project companies, raising interest rates and the overall cost of financing.152  
 
Power Sector Reform 
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Power sector reform began in Morocco in earnest in 1994 with the permitting of IPPs to 
sell electricity to the national grid. In 1997, private distribution companies were permitted 
to buy electricity from the grid and sell it in large cities.153 Like Egypt, IPP ownership in 
Morocco has been fully privatized and follows a scheme to return power generation 
assets back to the state at some future date.154  
ONE awarded the first contract for the construction of a privately-owned plant, 
the Jorf Lasfar IPP, to a joint venture between CMS Energy and ABB Energy Ventures in 
1996 following a competitive bidding process.155 The contract provided for the 
construction of two coal-fired, steam-based generation units to be erected adjacent to two 
similar older plants; CMS and ABB were also charged to take over management duties 
regarding the older plants.  
 
Subsidies 
At present, the Prime Minister’s Office keeps tariffs slightly lower than competitive rates 
by subsidizing private generators and distributors. While still substantial, electricity price 
subsidies in Morocco do not approach those in either Egypt or UAE. In fact, Moroccans 
pay a higher per kilowatt hour price for electricity than in the U.S. or anywhere else in 
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the MENA region.156 ONE moved to raise tariffs in the late 1990s and has continued to 
do so since. The state-run company is currently working with the World Bank to 
formulate a long-term, sustainable tariff reform plan.157  
Fuel products, namely oil and gas used for transportation, are heavily subsidized. 
Morocco paid $3 billion in fuel subsidies in 2010 when oil averaged $85 a barrel.158 As 
oil prices climb that number is expected to grow considerably.  
 
Impetus for Power Sector Reform 
Morocco has chosen to pursue power sector reform for a variety of reasons centered on 
the issues of rural electrification and economic efficiency. Morocco’s rural population is 
substantial – 45% of all households; however, the Moroccan electricity grid is highly 
centralized, designed to service urban centers and industrial sites.159 Rural households 
with miniscule demand profiles strain ONE’s finances as the utility is forced to erect 
costly infrastructure over vast distances while facing minimal prospects for financial 
remittances.  
The World Bank and other multilateral financing institutions have played a 
critical role in Morocco’s decision to move ahead with reform efforts, offering the 
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Moroccan government a host of incentives to allow private developers to operate in 
Morocco.  In keeping with its stipulations for loans and other multilateral funds, the 
World Bank and its institutional peers offered Morocco significant financial assistance to 
support its reform efforts. The bank not only offered loans, but also a partial risk 
guarantee for private investors; that is if the plant failed to meet economic expectations, 
the bank would ensure investor losses up to a certain point.160 The Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Export-Import Bank of the United States, as well as 
Swiss and Italian Export Credit Agencies also provided loans and risk mitigation 
services.161  
 These financial assurances were critical in light of Morocco’s lack of a country 
credit rating at the time of reform. Without the assistance of these institutions, it is 
doubtful that there would be adequate financing available for the construction of the two 
coal-fired units that signaled Morocco’s move toward liberalizing power sector reform. 
Advisors from the World Bank Group and other multilateral institutions helped Morocco 
build the necessary legal and technical frameworks that allowed it to engage with the 
private sector.162 The actions of these institutions during the Jorf Lasfar project helped 
establish the parameters for all future private power projects.  
 
Renewable Energy Drivers 





The drivers behind Morocco’s move toward renewable energy are more numerous and 
significant than those of either Abu Dhabi or Egypt. Morocco relies almost exclusively 
on foreign sources for its primary energy needs. IEA energy balance statistics put local 
energy production in Morocco at 782 ktoe, while imports stand at 15,678 ktoe; imports 
total roughly 95% of total energy consumed. The country’s reliance on imports mean that 
price fluctuations can take a particularly severe economic toll.  
As of 2009, Iran had been providing roughly a quarter of the country’s oil, with 
the rest being supplied by Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Iraq. 163 In that same year, Mohamed 
VI severed diplomatic ties with Iran citing that country’s intention of spreading Shi’a 
Islam in Morocco. This move was spurred by Saudi Arabia, which promised to make up 
Iranian imports at subsidized prices provided the Moroccan king demonizes the tiny 
Moroccan Shi’a population. Saudi Arabia has made similar promises to other fast 
growing country economies provided they behave accordingly with Iran; however, its 
ability to fulfill these promises remains questionable.  
 Renewable energy figures prominently in the country’s Global Rural 
Electrification Programme (PERG). An elaborate public-private partnership centered on 
erecting distributed solar energy systems – to be described in greater detail below – has 
been setup to electrify a large portion of Morocco’s most rural areas.164 This initiative has 
resulted in greater access to French bilateral aid in the form of soft loans as well as 
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technical assistance for the construction of what could prove to be a long-term solution to 
Morocco’s rural electrification problems.  
 Morocco’s proximity to some of the world’s largest electricity markets in Western 
Europe affords it the potential of becoming a major energy exporter should it prove 
capable of producing electricity in commercial quantities. Premiums offered by Western 
European governments for electricity produced via renewables could make this market 
particularly attractive. Europe, for its part, has shown great interest in the energy 
resources of its MENA region neighbors situated along the Mediterranean coast. Having 
sponsored a massive study assessing the potential for energy infrastructure integration 
across the Mediterranean in 2000, the European Commission has since become the 
primary sponsor and financier of the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market Integration 
Project (MED-EMIP) whose primary aim is to assist in the integration of the regional 
energy market.165  
 The events of the Arab Spring have cast Morocco’s renewable energy initiatives 
in a more favorable light. Cooperation among North African governments has increased 
and long-standing trade agreements, such as that between Morocco and Algeria, have 
been revived in the wake of political upheaval.166 Morocco seeks to increase its influence 
in region and boost the bargaining power of the south via the north within the context of 
the regional energy market.  
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Renewable Energy Developments 
Unlike Abu Dhabi’s Masdar which oversees the totality of the emirate’s renewable 
energy projects and initiatives, renewable energy developments in Morocco are being 
directed by a variety of government agencies and international agreements.  
 
Government Agencies 
Among the two agencies with renewable energy mandates, CDER is the most significant 
as well as the oldest. Established in 1982, the agency’s focus centers on providing 
renewable expertise, training renewable energy specialists, and initiating renewable 
energy pilot projects.167 CDER is also active in promoting renewable energy in rural 
areas through the Maisons de l’Energie program; the program works with the assistance 
of the UNDP to develop small enterprises geared towards meeting the energy needs of 
rural communities.  
 A second agency aimed at disseminating information was created in 2000, 
CIEDE. The operation of CIEDE involves the participation of several stakeholders, 
including: CDER, the Ministry of Energy, Mining, Water and Environment, the Ministry 
of the Territory Planning, the United Nations Program for Development / Global 
Environment Facility (UNDP/GEF) as well as other departments within the National 
Committee on Climate Change.168 CIEDE functions as a sort of think-tank drawing on 




the knowledge and perspectives of its stakeholders in order to generate substantive 
renewable energy and energy efficiency data before disseminating it to the Moroccan 
public.  
The third major agency was established in 2009 in order to administer the 
Moroccan Solar Plan, the Moroccan Solar Energy Agency (MASEN).169 MASEN is 
responsible for developing the country’s solar capacity. On March 30, 2010, the agency 
issued its first RfP for the construction of a 500 MW solar plant in Ouarzazate, 
Morocco.170  
Professional Organizations 
A third organization that operates outside the traditional government structure, but no 
doubt with its approval, is the L’Association Marocaine des Industries Solaires et 
Eoliennes (AMISOLE). AMISOLE is a professional organization created in 1987 that 
represents the interests of renewable energy companies as well as individual 
stakeholders.171 Unlike similar professional associations in the U.S., AMISOLE does not 
focus on legislative lobbying, which is likely done through much more informal and 
secretive channels. Instead, AMISOLE acts as a networking tool for renewable energy 
companies; currently, there are 40 member companies.   
National Strategies and Frameworks 
National Energy Strategy 
                                                
169 REEEP. 
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The most recent national energy strategy was articulated by the MEMEE in 2009. The 
strategy’s broad focus is on security and diversity of supply as a means to reduce import 
dependency, lower costs, improve access to electricity, and generate positive 
environmental externalities. The development of renewable energy resources figures 
prominently as a means to achieve these ends. By 2020, renewable generation facilities 
are to represent 42% of installed generation capacity in country. The plan calls for an 
even breakdown in terms of sources between solar, wind, and hydropower, with 14% to 
come from each source.172  
Energie Pro 
Energie Pro is a program setup by ONE to incentivize private operators to develop wind 
farms. ONE guarantees private developers access to the national grid and promises to 
purchase any surplus generated by the developers not used to power their own facilities 
or those of their clients.173  
Moroccan Solar Plan  
The Moroccan Solar Plan is a solar energy focused sub-strategy of the country’s national 
energy strategy managed by MASEN to develop 2000 MW of solar energy capacity by 
2020.  
International Frameworks 
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Desertec is essentially a conceptual framework emphasizing the energy-rich nature of the 
earth’s desert landscapes. It was initiated under the auspices two globally-oriented think-
tanks: the Club of Rome and the German Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy 
Cooperation. Although global in scope, Desertec’s focus has been on the Euro-
Mediterranean region. The current Desertec proposal aims to create a vast network of 
renewable energy generation facilities throughout North Africa capable of supporting 
local needs, while supplying continental Europe with 15% of its electricity.174  
 A joint corporate venture, Dii GmbH, in which the Desertec Foundation is a 
shareholder, was established in 2009 to promote a strong investment climate in the 
MENA region for renewables through the development of political, economic, 
technological and regulatory frameworks.175 Morocco is playing a central role in Dii 
GmbH’s plan, serving as the site for one of the corporation’s reference projects. Dii 
GmbH is supporting Ouarzazate plant and several other plants still in the design phase as 
test projects; Dii corporation is the ‘private operator’ responsible for the construction and 
operation of the plant.  
 
Current and Planned Renewable Projects 
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At present, Morocco’s large-scale renewable generation facilities draw from either wind 
or hydropower sources. The country’s four hydropower stations located in Afourer, Al 
Massira, B. El Ouidane, and Hassan have a total capacity of 424 MW.176 The first large-
scale wind farm – 140 MW capacity – began operation in Melloussa in June 2010.177 
Meanwhile, several smaller wind generation sites operating under ONE’s autoproducers 
program have been feeding into the grid for the past several years, putting the country’s 
total wind capacity at 286 MW.178 
 Among renewable energy systems, distributed solar generation systems currently 
serve perhaps the largest number of Moroccan residents, estimated at 163,000 through 
26,000 solar home energy systems deployed throughout Morocco’s rural areas.179 These 
systems have been put in place by Tenasol, a French energy company. Meanwhile, ONE 
subsidized installation costs that Tenasol may offer lower prices to rural consumers.180 
 In terms of planned projects, there is quite a bit on the table for Morocco. Aside 
from the Desertec driven Ouarzazate solar facility, African Development Bank reports 
indicate that there are several other large-scale projects for which Morocco has already 
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devised as investment plan.181 These projects include two winds farms in Tangiers and in 
Al Koudia Al Baida with capacities of 150 MW and 300 MW respectively, and a 350 
MW hydropower plant in Abeld Moumen, among others.  
 
Power Sector Reform and Renewable Energy 
Through its power sector reform efforts, Morocco has divested a large portion of its state-
run capacity while allowing private developers to construct new facilities to the extent 
that the majority of electricity generated in the country comes from privately controlled 
sources. This has all been done despite the lack of an independent regulator or a strong 
regulatory framework defining the terms of interaction between public and private 
entities. ONE has simply contracted with private developers and administered its contract 
without the oversight of an independent body.  
 Despite these regulatory deficiencies, private developers have proliferated 
throughout Morocco and through this a private market has been established and a certain 
modus operandi entrenched. The fact that such a large number of private operators 
continue to do business in Morocco boosts investor confidence in the country’s power 
sector. This investor confidence will no doubt aid Morocco in its bid to contract with 
renewable energy developers.   
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 Yet, Morocco’s greatest asset, in terms of the development of both its power 
sector infrastructure and its renewable energy resources, is its close proximity to and 
relationship with Western Europe. As a result of these two factors, a host of public and 
private European and global organizations are eager to assist Moroccan officials in 
developing the necessary legal and technical frameworks that the Moroccan power sector 
may operate most efficiently; Morocco is to be a test case for the massive energy 
integration scheme whereby North African electricity finds its way to European markets.  
  
Conclusion 
The Moroccan rationale for pursing renewable energy is perhaps stronger than that of any 
other country in the MENA region owing to a combination of the absence of domestic 
fossil fuel supplies, massive wind and solar potential, and proximity to European 
markets. Morocco’s relatively open economy and close political relationship with West 
have helped to attract a large number of private power operators and made the Moroccan 
electricity market an attractive one.  
 The problem with Morocco’s renewable energy sector is similar to that of Egypt: 
an overreliance on foreign aid and other initiatives for the sector’s development. 
European funded studies and favorable financing terms are driving renewable energy in 
Morocco more than any government institutions – despite the fact that there are three. 
This is especially true for large-scale generation. Morocco is offering no feed-in tariff for 
renewable generators and it is unclear how the buying and selling of electricity from 
more expensive renewable sources is to be justified.  
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 At the small-scale level, Morocco has given the free market free reign, allowing 
producers of 50MW or less to operate as independent businesses with minimal licensing 
requirements and made solar energy the solution at the rural level. Yet, Morocco stands 
to gain considerably if renewables are produces en masse, whether or not its initiatives 




Conclusion:  Common Themes, Lessons Learned and Recommendations 
Regarding Power Sector Structure and Renewable Energy Development 
 
Drivers of Interaction between Power Sector Reform and Renewable Energy 
Having looked at the state of renewable energy development and power sector reform in 
three MENA region countries, this paper will attempt to extract a set of common themes 
regarding the interaction between renewables and reform. The aim here is to outline key 
aspects of reform affecting the prospect of renewable energy development domestically. 
Among the specific features of power sector reform initiatives affecting renewable 
energy prospects in the MENA region are the level of financial supervision by the local 
government, engagement with IPPs via the single buyer model, and the level of 
electricity subsidies.  
 
Financial Supervision by the Local Government 
Financial supervision by the local government has been instrumental in incubating the 
domestic renewable energy sector. In each of the three cases examined, the local 
government has assumed the role of investor and financial guarantor; however, the level 
and nature of both the investments made and insurance provided has differed across each 
country.  
 Abu Dhabi is acting as the primary investor in its first large-scale concentrated 
solar power plant.182 Having secured financing from several domestic and international 
banks, Masdar has chosen follow its IPP investment model by purchasing a 60% stake in 
the project, while offering 20% stakes to two separate Spanish and French energy 
                                                
182 Carvalho, Stanley. "UAE's Masdar gets $615 mln solar plant financing." Reuters. March 7, 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/07/masdar-financing-idUSLDE72607Q20110307 (accessed March 
27, 2012). 
 71 
companies. As stated previously, this large equity stake is also a type of financial 
guarantee for Abu Dhabi’s investment partners, given the considerable resources it 
possesses to ensure the project’s survival.  
 Egypt has gone a step further than Abu Dhabi. Through the NREA, it maintains 
complete ownership of all renewable energy projects. Despite recent moves to allow 
limited private sector participation on the generation side, Egypt has chosen to forgo 
allowing private developers to take the lead on the renewables front. The rationale for 
this decision lies in the NREA’s ability to secure more favorable financing terms and 
even direct financial aid in the form of grants, which do not have to be repaid.  
 As for Morocco, the picture is slightly more complicated. Like Egypt, the 
Moroccan equivalent of the NREA, MASEN, will act as the owner and borrower of what 
is to be the country’s first commercial-scale solar plant in Ouarzazate.183 However, 
whereas the NREA acted both as primary owner and developer – with onsite NREA 
personnel building and operating the wind farms at Zafarana – MASEN is soliciting the 
help of a private developer.  
 If maximizing the development of renewable energy in the most efficient and 
economical fashion is the goal, then the issue of what is the right amount of direct 
financial involvement by the local government must be raised. Addressing this issue 
strictly from a theoretical standpoint, as these projects have yet to be completed and 
sourcing for this paper has been limited to publicly available publications, it would seem 
that a certain level of domestic governmental financial support is necessary for the 
development of renewables at this stage. Despite the push for greater privatization and 
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minimal governmental involvement in the power sector, such involvement remains 
necessary if renewables are to flourish in the MENA region for a variety of reasons.  
 Conventional power sector projects offer notoriously long periods before 
achieving full cost recovery. For renewables, this period may be longer or shorter, but as 
of yet, a standard net present value for large-scale wind and solar projects in developing 
countries does not truly exist, as the number of projects running long-term is extremely 
limited. In both Morocco and Egypt, legal and technical frameworks for private 
investment are underdeveloped. Soliciting full-private ownership in these countries for 
technologies that have seen limited testing at the commercial level would be difficult. 
Abu Dhabi’s legal energy frameworks are more developed; however, given the cost of 
renewables compared to conventional sources, attracting private developers, even with a 
feed-in tariff, could be challenging. At this point, a certain level of financial supervision 
by the local government remains necessary.  
 
The Single Buyer Model 
Each of the three countries examined follows a single buyer model, whereby a 
government-run transmission network acts as the sole facilitator of transactions between 
generators and distributors and distributors are unable to contract directly with 
generators.  
Proponents of the single buyer model see it as practically and economically 
beneficial in several ways. First, they see it as a relatively simple step governments can 
take along the road to increasing competition that does not require extensive and 
sophisticated rulemaking and execution strategies. Second, they argue that debt-laden 
public utilities will be more able to avoid stranded costs – that is infrastructure costs 
incurred that cannot be recovered due to a change in the regulatory environment; the 
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single buyer model preserves an important role for the state in power sector and its 
finances. Lastly, as mentioned previously, the single buyer model shields IPP investors 
form the risks associated with wholesale electricity markets.  
Detractors, specifically policy specialists from the World Bank and its 
institutional peers, cite that single buyer models where government officials make 
decisions about when to shift or add to the generation mix are uneconomical as they are 
driven by politics rather than market forces.184 In this same vein, they argue that the PPAs 
offered IPPs can undermine the government’s financial position as they lock the 
government into paying a fixed price for long periods regardless of changing economic 
conditions; these financial difficulties are felt by the citizenry in its entirety. Essentially, 
the possibility of corruption and economically inefficient operation increases drastically 
under the single buyer model.  
 Clearly, there are both advantages and disadvantages to the single buyer model, 
but the central issue here is whether or not a state-controlled transmission company or a 
neutral third party transmission system operator would be better for renewable energy 
development. The benefits of the single buyer model as contracting with the national 
energy agenda in mind have already been outlined above. That is a state-owned single 
buyer can offer prices that make renewable energy economical for developers. 
 Yet, could not the common set of policy incentives such as tradable renewable 
energy credits, net metering, renewable portfolio standards, and feed-in tariffs be 
executed by private generators and distributors? In many ways, this depends on 
prevailing socio-cultural norms and the general business environment. That is, how likely 
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is it that business leaders will follow the rules, and how, and to what extent can they get 
around them. For example, the usefulness of tradable renewable energy tax credits in 
promoting renewable energy depends on tax structure and enforcement. If taxes are not 
strictly levied, than tax credits would not be very useful. The same goes for other 
financial incentives offered by the government.  
Therefore, corruption levels and the soundness of existing legal and financial 
frameworks are key in determining whether a single buyer model or a more fully 
privatized model would be better for renewables. In Morocco and Egypt, corruption is 
rampant and legal and financial institutions are underdeveloped by Western standards. In 
Abu Dhabi, however, corruption levels approach those of the U.S.: Transparency 
International’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index put the U.S. at 24 and the UAE at 28 
out of a total 183 countries.185 
 
Subsidies 
Significantly subsidizing the price consumers pay for electricity could drive up demand 
to the extent that renewable energy becomes less attractive economically. Since 
renewables are not yet cost competitive with fossil fuels, some level of public financial 
backing is needed. The economic value of this backing depends on the size of the project. 
If subsidy driven demand is extremely high and growing, then increasing the share of 
energy generated by renewable energy will become more costly.  
 Subsidies in Morocco are minor; however, those in Abu Dhabi and Egypt are 
significant. In Abu Dhabi, this has lead to considerable waste; its subsidies are in place 
only to show the benevolence of the state. In Egypt, however, the removal of subsidies 
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Over the past two decades, MENA region regimes have sought to streamline and increase 
the efficiency of their power sectors according to the standards of the World Bank and 
other multilateral financing institutions, while simultaneously developing domestic 
renewable energy sources. This paper has attempted to show how these two agendas can 
both promote and detract from one another. The level of institutional development, 
corruption, and nature of the relationship between the government and its citizens can 
significantly affect how privatization-oriented power sector reform initiatives influence 
renewable energy development.  
 Massive upheaval has upended many of the existing institutional arrangements in 
the region, although the UAE has remained largely untouched by this phenomenon. In 
light of these events, the international community has been strategizing on new ways to 
engage the region and economic considerations are perpetually at the forefront of most 
diplomatic plans. Both power sector reform and renewable energy development are part 
of this economic calculus. Hopefully, this paper has provided some insight into how these 
two forces interact and how they could be promoted by international institutions in the 
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